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trial judge declared: "I instruct you that as a matter of law Officer Davies [the
agent of the defendant] did in fact assault and falsely arrest and imprison plain-
tiff. Therefore, the only question remaining for you to determine is whether these
acts were committed within the scope of Davies' employment as a Housing
Authority Officer." 92 The Appellate Division, in reversing the trial court on
the basis of the incorrect charge, declared that the defendant's resting did not
necessarily amount to a concession of the facts establishing liability. 3 In
addition, even though the testimony of an interested witness is not impeached
or contradicted, the fact that he is interested places a cloud upon the truthful-
ness or accuracy of the testimony. The jury should be entitled to pass on the
issue of credibility.94
The Court of Appeals approved the charge of the trial court and reversed
the decision of the Appellate Division in the instant case. Where the evidence
presented by the interested party "is not contradicted by direct evidence, nor by
any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and it is not opposed to the
probabilities; nor in its nature, surprising, or suspicious, there is no reason
for denying to it conclusiveness." 95 The Court held that the testimony of the
plaintiff fulfilled these requirements and, in addition, was corroborated by a
disinterested observer; therefore, the issues as to assault, false arrest and false
imprisonment were properly taken out of the domain of the jury 00
In order to substantiate further its opinion, the Court relied on the
presumption that arrest and imprisonment without a warrant are unlawful
and the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption is on the
defendant. 97 As the defendant offered absolutely no evidence to rebut the
presumption, and as the trial judge believed that no reasonable jury could




RESCISSION OF AUTOIOBILE INSURANCE POLICY PROCURED BY FRAUD
Under Article 6 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, effective in April 1956,
no motor vehicle can be registered in New York State without a certificate of
insurance or evidence of a financial security bond.' This article further provides
92. Respondent's Brief, 7345 Cases & Points, Case 6. p. 9.
93. 11 A.D.2d 329, 205 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st Dep't 1960).
94. Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N.Y. 177 (1877); 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice,
pp. 713-714 (1953).
95. Hull v. Littauer, 162 N.Y. 569, 572, 57 N.E. 102, 103 (1900). See also Der
Ohannessian v. Elliot, 233 N.Y. 326, 135 N.E. 518 (1922).
96. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 457-a(1).
97. Clark v. Nannery, 292 N.Y. 105, 54 N.E.2d 31 (1944); Bonnau v. State, 278 App.
Div. 181, 104 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 721, 103 N.E.2d 340 (1951).
1. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, art. 6, § 312.
COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
that no insurance policy for which a certificate of insurance has been issued
shall be terminated by cancellation until 20 days after a notice to terminate
has been mailed to the insured.2 The policy behind Article 6 as provided by
the Legislature is the protection of innocent victims of motor vehicle accidents.
3
Bearing the above in mind, we can now turn to the principal case of Aetna
Casualty and Surety Company v. O'Connor4 where the Court of Appeals was
faced with the problem of determining the method of terminating a policy of
insurance issued under the Assigned Risk Plan.
The Assigned Risk Plan was promulgated by the Superintendent of Insur-
ance under the power granted him by the Insurance Law.5 The plan as pro-
mulgated was mandatory on all insurance companies writing automobile
insurance in New York. They were required to issue insurance policies to per-
sons who are bad risks but otherwise entitled to insurance.
In the O'Connor case, insurance had been obtained on June 8, 1955, under
the Assigned Risk Plan through fraud on the part of the insured. On March 4,
1956, O'Connor was involved in an accident causing personal injuries and
property damage to the defendants, Millie and Perley Hamilton. Upon noti-
fication of the accident, Aetna investigated and discovered the prior fraud.
They then elected to rescind the policy, and brought this action for declaratory
judgment against the defendants. The Court of Appeals held, as did the courts
below, 6 that although under the plan Aetna had a right to cancel, it did not
have the right to rescind.
The plaintiff argued that since its right to rescind was a common law
right, the right could be taken away only by a clear declaration to that effect.
They based their argument on the theory that a statute in derogation of the
common law must be strictly construed. 7 The Court agreed that the case
depended on the construction to be given the plan, but stated that it called
for a careful reading of the plan in the light of the circumstances surrounding
its adoption and not for the "overly abstract principle of statutory interpreta-
tion" advocated by the plaintiff.
The Court reasoned that if it was a complete and comprehensive plan
covering all the rights and duties of the parties, then the plaintiff's right would
be lost if it was not provided for in the statute. The Court then examined the
scope of the promulgations and the nature of the Assigned Risk Plan and decided
that the insurer's only means of cancellation is by 10-days notice, as provided
by the plan. They also pointed out that the insurer is really at fault for failing
2. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313.
3. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 310.
4. 8 N.Y.2d 359, 207 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1960).
S. N.Y. Ins. Law § 63.
6. 8 A.D.2d 530, 190 N.Y.S.2d 795 (2d Dep't 1959).
7. The plaintiff failed to argue that the promulgations were unconstitutional as a
delegation of the legislative power.
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to make a thorough investigation, and that the ultimate beneficiary will not be
the wrongdoer but will be the innocent victim.
The O'Connor case, as it effects an insurer's right to rescind under the
Assigned Risk Plan, is really moot because Section 313 of the Vehicle and
Traffic Law is all inclusive.8 Therefore, it clearly supersedes the promulgations
of the Superintendent of Insurance to the extent that they provide for cancel-
lation. However, the O'Connor case is indicative of the present Court of
Appeal's thinking on an insurer's right to rescind for fraud once an innocent
third party has been injured by the insured. New Jersey and other jurisdictions
have arrived at the same position under their Financial Responsibility Acts.0
A recent case in the Appellate Division, Tetter v. Allstate Insurance Con-
pany, held that the notice required in Section 313 of the Vehicle and Traffic
Law had abolished the insurer's common law right to rescission ab initio, even
though there was no injury to an innocent third party.'0 The court reasoned
that to allow rescission ab initio would, one, make it impossible for the insured
to comply with the statute (insured is required to have continuous coverage),
and two, render him retroactively guilty of a misdemeanor (operating a motor
vehicle without insurance coverage).
It would appear that the determining factor in this area is the fear that
innocent victims of auto accidents may suffer. Although the Tetter case did
not involve an innocent victim, to reverse the case on appeal the Court of
Appeals would have to decide that the right to rescind was defeated only when
an innocent third party was involved, and to indicate that his prior acts were
lawful. To reverse, therefore, would require a strained interpretation of the
statute. These two cases should give the insurance companies writing auto-
mobile liability insurance clear notice that once they issue the FS-1 form the
only way they can terminate is by complying with the statute. This burden
(prior investigation before issuance of the policy) imposed on the insurance
companies is far down the scale of values when compared with the benefits to
innocent victims and society as a whole.
R.E.N.
FOREIGN LIFE INSURER LICENSED IN STATE MAY CONTROL INSURANCE Fnus
ENGAGED N NoN-LIFE BusiNss
In Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Superintendent of Ins., the Court of Appeals
held that an out-of-state life insurance company licensed in New York can gain
control of another company which deals in fire and casualty insurance and still
maintain the privilege of issuing life insurance in New York."
8. N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law § 313:
. . every insurance policy for which a certificate of insurance (FS-1 form) has
been issued.
9. Atlantic Casualty Insurance Company v. Bingham, 10 N.J. 460, 92 A.2d 1
1952; see also Annot., 171 A.L.R. 550 (1947) and 34 A.L.R.2d 1297 (1954).
10. 9 A.D.2d 176, 192 N.Y.S.2d 610 (4th Dep't 1959).
11. 10 N.Y.2d 42, 217 N.Y.S.2d 39 (1961).
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